Zenon is a compact text font in four weights.
Zenon appears as a Renaissance revival with
modernish proportions. A closer look reveals
that it is a typographic potpourri.

For an overview of Zenon see here.
For the Reading MATD specimen see here.

Zenon Regular

Zenon Italic

Zenon Medium

Zenon Medium Italic

Zenon Bold

Zenon Bold Italic

Zenon Black

Zenon Black Italic

The Architecture of Theories by Charles Peirce

THREE QUESTIONS, AT LEAST, I THINK IT MUST be admitted, ought to form the subject of studies preliminary to the formation of any philosophical theory; namely, 1st, the purpose of the theory, 2nd, the proper method of discovering it, 3rd the method of proving it to be true. I think, too, it can hardly be denied that it will be safer to consider these questions concerning the particular theory which is to be sought, in the light of whatever we can ascertain regarding the functions, the discovery, and the establishment of sound theories in general. But these are questions of logic; and thus, no matter whether we ultimately decide to rest our philosophy upon logical principles as data, or upon psychological laws, or upon physical observations or upon mystical experiences, or upon intuitions of first principles, or testimony, in any event these logical questions have to be considered first.

BUT IF LOGIC IS THUS TO PRECEDE PHILOSOPHY, will it not be unphilosophical logic? *Perhaps logic is not in much need of philosophy.* Mathematics, which is a species of logic, has never had the least need of philosophy in

If we do not know how to express relations of virtue, honor, and love, in diagrams, those ideas do not become rubbish; any more than red, blue, and green are rubbish. But just as the relations of colors can be expressed diagrammatically, so it must be supposed that moral relations can be expressed. At any rate, until this is done

The two words logic and reason take their origin from two opposite views of the nature of thought. Logic, from logos, meaning word and reason, embodies the Greek notion that reasoning cannot be done without language. Reason, from the Latin ratio, originally meaning an account, implies that reasoning is

Diagrams have constantly been used in logic, from the time of Aristotle; and no difficult reasoning can be performed without them. Algebra has its formulae, which are a sort of diagrams. And what are these diagrams for? They are to make experiments upon. The results of these experiments are often quite surprizing. Who would guess beforehand that the square of the hypotheneuse of a rightangled triangle was equal to the sum of the squares of the legs? Thou

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The object of a theory is to render something intelligible. The object of philosophy is to render everything intelligible. Philosophy thus postulates that the processes of nature are intelligible. Postulates, I say, not assumes. It may not be so; but only so far as it is so can philosophy accomplish its purpose; it is therefore committed to going upon that assumption, true or not. It is the forlorn hope. But as far as the process of nature is intelligible, so far is the process of nature identical with the process of reason; the law of being and the law of thought must be practically assumed to be

All reasoning is experimentation, and all experimentation is reasoning. If this be so, the conclusion for philosophy is very important, namely, there really is no reasoning that is not of

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WHEN WE MAKE A MATHEMATICAL EXPERIMENT, IT IS THE PROCESS OF REASON WITHIN US WHICH BRINGS OUT THE RESULT. WHEN WE MAKE A CHEMICAL EXPERIMENT, IT IS THE PROCESS OF NATURE, ACTING BY AN INTELLIGIBLE, AND THEREFORE RATIONAL, LAW, WHICH BRINGS ABOUT THE RESULT. ALL REASONING IS EXPERIMENTATION, AND ALL EXPERIMENTATION IS REASONING. IF THIS BE SO, THE CONCLUSION FOR PHILOSOPHY IS VERY IMPORTANT, NAMELY, THERE REALLY IS

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THE OBJECT OF A THEORY IS TO RENDER SOMETHING INTELLIGIBLE. THE OBJECT OF PHILOSOPHY IS TO RENDER EVERYTHING INTELLIGIBLE. PHILOSOPHY THUS POSTULATES THAT THE PROCESSES OF NATURE ARE INTELLIGIBLE. POSTULATES, I SAY, NOT ASSUMES. IT MAY NOT BE SO; BUT ONLY SO FAR AS IT IS SO CAN PHILOSOPHY ACCOMPLISH ITS PURPOSE; IT IS THEREFORE COMMITTED TO GOING UPON THAT ASSUMPTION, TRUE OR NOT. IT IS THE FORLORN HOPE. BUT AS FAR AS THE PROCESS OF NATURE IS INTELLIGIBLE, SO FAR IS THE PROCESS OF NATURE IDENTICAL WITH THE PROCESS OF REASON; THE LAW OF BEING AND THE LAW

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Who would guess beforehand that the square of the hypotheneuse of a rightangled triangle was equal to the sum of the squares of the legs? Though involved in the axioms of geometry and the law of mind, this property is as occult as that of the magnet. When we make a mathematical experiment, it is the process of reason within us which brings out the result. When we make a chemical experiment, it is the process of nature, acting by an intelligible, and therefore rational, law, which brings about the result. All reasoning is experimentation, and all experimentation is reasoning. If this be so, the conclusion for philosophy is very important, namely, there really is no reasoning that is not of the nature of diagrammatic, or mathematical, reasoning; and therefore we must admit no conceptions which are not susceptible of being represented in diagrammatic

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